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In The Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
JOSEPH E. NELSON, 
Plaintiff, 
- v -
CLYDE L. MILLER, as Secretary of State 
of the State of Utah, 
Defendant. 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Case No. 
12258 
This is a petition for an extraordinary writ, 
which has been filed in the Utah Supreme Court 
by the plaintiff, in which the Supreme Court of the-
State of Utah has original jurisdiction under Section 
78-2-2, Utah Code Annotated 1953. This ·case has 
heretofore been briefed by the parties hereto, and 
has heretofore been argued before the Supreme 
Court of the State of Utah. However, the time per-
mitted for briefing the case was shorti and the 
court, after hearing arguments, ordered that supple-
mental briefs be filed. The court also therein or-
dered Judge Nelson's name placed on the ballot 
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and has reserved the issues as to constitutionality 
of the statute in question (Section 49-7-1.1, Utah Code 
Annotated 1953). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Judge Joseph E. Nelson, the plaintiff in this case, 
is presently a duly elected and acting Judge of the 
Fourth Judicial District Court of the State of Utah 
and has been such for several years. Judge Nelson's 
present term expires on December 31, 1970, and if 
Judge Nelson were to continue into another term, 
it would be necessary for him to either be reelected 
by the electorate of the State of Utah, or for him to 
be reappointed to that position by the Governor of 
the State of Utah after that position becomes vacant. 
Pursuant to the election statutes of the State 
of Utah, the defendant herein, filed a declaration ol 
candidacy for the office of Judge of the Fourth Judi-
cial District of the State of Utah. That declaration 
of candidacy was filed on the 26th day of June, 1970, 
and the statutory filing fee was tendered to the Sec· 
retary of State at that time. However, because of 
Judge Nelson's age (73), the Secretary of State re· 
fused to accept the filing fee and returned Judge 
Nelson's declaration of candidacy to him at that 
time. It has been stipulated by the parties that Judge 
Nelson meets the requirements to file for reelection 
unless his age prevents him from being eligible to 
run for reelection to his present office because of the 
provisions of Section 49-7-1.1, supra. 
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In 1968, the electorate of the State of Utah, by 
avote of 314,819 for and 72,652 against, approved 
an amendment to the Utah Constitution which was 
added as Section 28 of Art. VIII, and reads as fol-
lows: 
"The legislature may provide uniform 
standards for manditory retirement and for 
removal of judges from office. Legislation im-
plementing this section shall be applicable 
only· to conduct occurring subsequent to the 
effective date of such legislation. Any det-er-
mination requiring the retirement or removal 
of a judge from office shall be subject to re-
view, as to both law and facts, by the supreme 
court. This section is additional to and ac-
mulative with the methods of removal of 
justices and judges provided in sections 11 and 
27 of this Article." 
That amendment was carried as Proposition No. 
5 on the ballot, and the title of the bill which was 
presented to the public and which appeared on the 
ballot given to the voters on election day read as 
follows: 
"A JOINT RESOLUTION PROPOSING 
TO AMEND ARTICLE VIII OF THE CON-
STITUTION OF THE STATE BY THE AD-
DITION OF SECTION 28, AUTHORIZING 
THE LEGISLATURE TO PROVIDE FOR 
THE MANDATORY RETIREMENT AND 
FOR REMOVAL OF JUDGES FROM OF-
FICE." 
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As implementing legislation, the 1969 legisla-
ture passed Section 49-7-Ll, Utah Code Annotated 
which was intended to implement that constitutional 
amendment, and reads as follows: 
"A trial judge shall retire upon attaining 
the age of 70 years, and a supreme court judge 
shall retire upon attaining the age of 72 years; 
provided, however, any judge serving a term as 
judge on the effective date of this act who has 
attained. the age of retirement, or attains that 
age during his present term shall retire on the 
completion of his present term." 
Judge Nelson is now challenging the constitu-
tionality of that statute, and its constitutionality is 
the primary issue before the Court at this time. 
RELIEF SOUGHT BY THE PARTIES 
Judge Nelson has asked the Supreme Court of 
the State of Utah to issue an extraordinary writ di-
recting the Secretary of State to place his name upon ' 
the ballots as a candidate, in the Counties of Utah, 
Wasatch, Duchesne, Uintah, Summit and Daggett, 
for election to the office of Judge of the Fourth Judi-
cial District Court. Judge Nelson prays in the altern-
ative that the defendant be ordered to issue to him 
a Certificate of Election to the office of Judge of the 
Fourth Judicial District Court. 
The defendant's answer filed herein asks that 
the plaintiff's petition be dismissed and that all stat-
utes alleged to be unconstitutional be upheld as 
being constitutional. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
ANY LEGISLATION PROPERLY PASSED BY THE 
LEGISLATURE IS PRESUMED TO MEET ALL CON-
STITUTIONAL REQUIREMENTS, AND THE BURDEN 
OF SHOWING THAT ANY LEGISLATION IS UNCON-
STITUTIONAL RESTS WITH THE PARTY CHAL-
LENGING THAT LEGISLATION. 
With the passage of every piece of legislation 
there is a presumption that the new enactment is 
constitutional, and the burden of showing any un-
constitutionality rests with the party seeking its de-
strucion. This principal has been reitterated by the 
Utah Supreme Court on many occasions. In the case 
of Rio Grande Lumber Company v. Dorke, 50 Utah 114, 
167 Pac. 241, the Court, at pp. 119-120, stated it as 
follows: 
"[A/fter fully and fairly considering the 
powers of the legislative body and the limita-
tions of its power under the Constitution, if 
there is a reasonable doubt in the mind of the 
court, that doubt must be cast in favor of the 
validity of the act .... Mr. Justice Washing-
ington, of the Supreme Court of the United 
States, upon this point, uses the following 
language: 
'But if I could rest my opinion in favor 
of the constitutionality of the law on which 
the question arises, on no other ground than 
this doubt so felt and acknowledged, that alone 
would, in my estimation, be a satisfactory 
vindication of it. It is but a decent respect due 
to the wisdom, the integrity, and the patriotism 
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of the legislative body by which any law is 
passed to presume in favor of its validity until 
its violation of the constitution is proved be-
yond all reasonable doubt. That has always 
been the language of this court when that sub-
ject has called for its decision.' 
* * * * * 
Any other rule than this would be inconsistent 
and untenable from every point of view, and 
would be a reflection upon the wisdom and 
motives, and an interference with the preroga-
tives, of an independent co-ordinate depart-
ment. These rules are fundamental and ele-
mentary." 
This same principal has been stated by the Utah 
Supreme Court in Norville v. State Tax Commission, 98 
Utah 170, 97 P.2d 937, and Tintic Standard Mining Co. v. 
Utah County, 80 Utah 491, 15 P.2d 663, inter alia. 
In addition to the existence of a strong presump· 
tion of constitutionality, the courts unanimously 
place a heavy burden of proof on the party alleging 
unconstitutionality, and the Utah Supreme Court 
has required that unconstitutionality be shown 
beyond a reasonable doubt. In the case of Gubler v. Utah 
Teachers Retirement Board, 113 Utah 188 192 P.2d 580, 
2 A.L.R. 2d 1022, the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
"If there is reasonable doubt about the 
validity or invalidity of this act, then the duty 
of this court is to resolve the doubt in favor 
of constitutionality." (Emphasis added) 
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In that same case, at 113 Utah 200, the Court 
quoted with approval, from Section 39, Black's Hand-
book of Constitutional Law, the following state-
ments: 
"Every presumption is in favor of the 
constitutionality of an act of the legislature ... 
Every reasonable doubt must be resolved in 
favor of the statute, not against it; and the 
courts will not adjudge it invalid unless the 
violation of the constitution is, in their judg-
ment, clear, complete, and unmistakable." 
In State ex rel. University of Utah v. Candland, 36 Utah 
406, 164 Pac. 285, the court said: 
"(I)f the court entertains a reasonable 
doubt upon the question, then the law must be 
upheld." 
This same principal has also been stated in Norville 
I'. State Tax Commission, supra, Rio Grande Lumber Co. v. 
Dorke, supra, and Edler v. Edwards, 34 Utah 13, 95 Pac. 
367. 
In this case, it seems clear and unec;uivocal that 
there is much more than a reasonable doubt about 
the unconstitutionality of the statute in question, and 
the burden to show the unconstitutionality beyond a 
reasonable doubt has not been met here. 
Therefore, in view of the very strong presump-
tion of constitutionality of all legislative enact-
ments, and in view of the very strong pronounce-
ments by this court that any reasonable doubt about 
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the validity or invalidity of a statute rrcust l::G Ts 
solved in favor of constitutionality, it is respectfully 
submitted that the statute in question in this case 
should be clearly upheld. 
POINT II 
WHEN A STATUTE HAS TWO POSSIBLE CON-
STRUCTIONS AND ONE OF THOSE CONSTRUCTIONS 
WOULD VALIDATE THE STATUTE WHILE THE 
OTHER CONSTRUCTION WOULD RENDER IT UN-
CONSTITUTIONAL, THE COURT MUST ADOPT THE 
CONSTRUCTION WHICH WOULD VALIDATE THE 
STATUTE. 
One of plaintiff's contentions is that the imple-
menting legislation contained in Section 49-7-1.1 
exceeds the authority granted to the legislature in 
Article 8, Section 28. It is claimed that mandatory 
retirement must be based upon some "conduct" 
of the judge for whom mandatory retirement is pro-
vided. 
Such a claim is contrary to the accepted mean-
ing of the word retirement as now commonly used 
by our society. Retirement is most frequently based 
upon age and/ or disability. Retirement does not 
require any affirmative action or conduct, but mere-
ly requires the termination of employment or the 
termination of office upon the retirees reaching the 
usual set age of retirement. 
Conduct is seldom a basis of retirement, and 
the language included later in the amendment as 
---
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to conduct was clearly placed there, modifying the 
portion of the amendment providing for the removal 
of judges for cause and was not intended to apply 
to the portion of that section relating to mandatory 
retirement. In addition, it was to protect the judiciary 
from attempts being made to remove a judge from 
office for some past conduct on his part, which con-
duct had not been grounds for removal at the time 
the acts of conduct were performed. That phrase, if 
it relates to retirement, could reasonably be con-
strued to require the legislature to allow judges then 
serving elected terms upon the effective date of the 
legislation to continue to serve for the term for 
which they had already been elected prior to the 
enactment of mandatory retirement legislation, even 
though the judge may already have reached the 
mandatory retirement age, and such a provision 
was included by the legislature in enacting Section 
49-7-1.1. 
Other courts have discussed the distinctions 
between the words retirement, removal and dis-
charge. 
In Geary v. Phillips, 278 N.Y.S.2d 506, 53 Misc. 2d 337, 
the New York Supreme Court held that "retirement 
does not constitute removal," and in Jacobs v. New 
Jersey State Highway Authority, 54 N.J. 393, 255 A.2d 266, 
the Supreme Court of New Jersey said: 
"Retirement from employment has a con-
notation different from discharge. The former 
ordinarily significes voluntary withdrawal, the 
latter compulsory dismissal." 
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In the case of Morrison v. Department of Highways, 
229 La. 116, 85 So. 2d 51, the Supreme Court of 
Louisiana said that the words removal and retire-
ment "are not synonymous," although they did not 
elaborate on the distinctions. 
As is shown above, the statute in question, Sec-
tion 49-7-1.1, and the constitutional amendment un-
der which that statute was passed, are capable of 
two different types of construction. One construc-
tion would be as is argued by plaintiff, that the 
word "conduct" in the constitutional amendment 
applies to the standards for mandatory retirement 
as well as to the standards for removal of judges 
from office. The other possible construction would 
be that the word "conduct" only applies to the pro-
visions as to removal of judges, because the terrns 
"mandatory retirement" are commonly thought of 
not to require any conduct, as idefendant's con-
tention in this case. Therefore, since there are two 
possible constructions of the constituttional and 
statutory language, one of which would validate the 
statute while the other would render the statute 
unconstitutional, it is repecfully urged that the court 
should adopt the interpretation which would vali-
date the statute in conformance to the rule recited 
by this Court in many instances. 
In the case of Salter v. Nelson, 85 Utah 460, 39 P.2d 
1061, the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
"In our discussion of the various objec-
tions urged against the constitutionality of the 
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amendment ... , it is necessary to keep in 
mind certain elementary rules of statutory con-
struction among which are: That when the 
validity of a statute assailed upon construtional 
grounds and there are two possible construc-
tions by one of which the statute would be ren-
dered unconstitutional and the other valid, 
the court should adopt the later construction." 
In the case of Norville, v. State Tax Commission, supra, 
the Utah Supreme Court again held: 
"When there is ambiguity in the terms of 
a statute or when it is susceptible of two in-
terpretations, one of which would render it un-
constitutional and the other bring it within 
constitutional sanctions, the court is bound to 
choose that interpretation which would uphold 
the statute, and to produce a statute unconsti-
tional only when the case is so clear as to be 
free from doubt. Highland Boy Gold Mining 
Co. v. Strickley, (28 Utah 215, 78 P. 296, 1 
L.R.A., N.S., 976, 107 Am. St. Rep. 711, 3 
Ann. Cas. 1110 affirmed in 200 U.S. 527, 26 
S.Ct. 301, 50 L. Ed. 581, 4 Ann. Cas. 1174) 
Stillman v. Lynch, 56 Utah 540, 192 P. 272; 
Denver & Rio Grande v. Grand County, 51 
Utah 294, 170 P. 74, 3 A.L.R. 1224; Powell v. 
Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678, 8 S.Ct. 992, 1257, 
32 L. Ed. 253; 11 Am. Jur. Sec. 92 at p. 719 
et seq." 
This same principle has also been cited in Tintic 
Standard Mining Co. v. Utah County, supra. This principle 
has also been very well stated in 16 Am. Jur. 2d, 
Constitutional Law, Sec. 145, wherein it states: 
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"It is an elementary principle that where 
the validity of a statute is assailed and there 
are two possible interpretations, by one of 
which the statute would be unconstitutional 
and by the other it would be valid, the court 
should adopt the construction which will up-
hold it, even though the construction which is 
adopted does not appear to be as natural as 
the other." 
Although the plaintiff may argue that his construc-
tion of the constitutional language seems more 
natural and would fit in better, according to the 
above statement from Am. Jur. 2d, the court should 
still validate the statute where there are two pos-
sible interpretations of it, "even though the con-
sruction which is adopted does not appear to be as 
natural as the other." 
In view of the above, it is respectfully submit-
ted that the statute in question and the constitu-
tional amendment are capable of two types of con· 
struction, and the court should clearly rule that the 
statute is constitutional and harmonious with the ' 
constitutional requirements. 
POINT III 
WHEN THE VOTERS OF THE STATE OF UTAH , 
APPROVED THE CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT, 
THEY BELIEVED THAT IT WAS A PROVISION TO 
MANDATORILY RETIRE JUDGES FROM OFFICE 
UPON THE ATTAINMENT OF A GIVEN AGE, AND 
THE COURT, IF POSSIBLE, SHOULD INTERPRET IT 
TO MEAN WHAT IT MEANT TO THE VOTERS. 
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As was mentioned earlier, the title of Proposi-
tion No. 5 as it appeared on the ballot, and the title 
of the bill which was always presented to the public 
and which the voters saw as they voted for and ap-
proved the proposition read as follows: 
"A JOINT RESOLUTION PROPOSING 
TO AMEND ARTICLE VIII OF THE CON-
STITUTION OF THE STATE OF UTAH BY 
THE ADDITION OF SEC. 28, AUTHORIZ-
ING THE LEGISLATURE TO PROVIDE 
FOR THE MANDATORY RETIREMENT 
AND FOR THE REMOVAL OF JUDGES 
FROM OFFICE." 
Thus, as the voters entered the voting booth to de-
cide this issue, the above statement was what they 
read, and the wording which they had before them 
at the time they voted in favor of the proposition. 
This title to the proposition clearly sets forth that 
the voters believed they were voting for a provision 
which would authorize the legislature to provide 
for the mandatory retirement of judges as well as 
for the removal of judges from office. Under the 
current understanding of today's society of these 
terms, the public would have believed they were 
voting for the mandatory retirement of judges upon 
the reaching of some age to be determined by the 
legislature, and for judges to be removed from of-
fice for certain conduct which would constitute 
cause for removal. 
The above stated principle has been clearly 
approved by the Utah Supreme Court before in the 
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case of Tintic Standard Mining Co. v. Utah County, supra, 
in which the Utah Supreme Court accepted a defi-
nition because it was commonly accepted and well 
established, and they stated: 
"We are restricted to this definition be-
cause of another canon of constitution con-
struction that terms used in a constitution 
must be taken to mean what they meant to the 
minds of the voters of the state when the pro-
vision was adopted." (Emphasis added) 
Involuntary retirement based on age exists 
throughout American culture today, in both the pub-
lic and private sector. Persons associate retirement 
with age. Retirement for conduct is not common in 
our society and would not have been considered 
by a voter deciding how to vote on this proposed , 
amendment. 
POINT IV 
THE CLASSIFICATION MADE BY THE LEGISLA· 
TURE IN SECTION 49-7-1.1 IS NOT UNREASONABLE 
OR ARBITRARY AND THERE IS A REASONABLE 
BASIS FOR DIFFERENTIATION BETWEEN CLASSES. 
Plaintiff also claims that the provision of Sec-
tion 49-7-1.1, setting forth a different retirement age 
for a trial judge than a supreme court judge violates 
the requirement of the constitutional amendment 
which states that the legislature may provide "uni-
fonn standards for mandatory retirement." 
It was undoubtedly contemplated by the draft· 
ers of the constitutional langauge that maximum 
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protection should be given to an individual judge 
so that some standards could not be enacted 
singling out any judge for special treatment allow-
ing him to remain in office or to require his retire-
ment, and was also meant to comply with already 
well established constitutional law concepts of 
equal protection. 
In the case of Hansen v. Public Employees Retirement 
System Board of Administration, 122 Utah 44 246 P.2d 
591, the Supreme Court of Utah, in considering a re-
tirement act dealing with other state employees, 
dealt with very similar issues. The court therein 
made the following statements which set forth 
proper legal concepts applicable here: 1 
"Some such inequities are practically in-
evitable in all retirement systems, especially in 
the first years of their operation." 
"It was therefore essential that some 
classification be made." 
"As to discrimination: an act is never 
unconstitutional because of discrimination so 
long as there is some reasonable basis for dif-
ferentiation between classes which is related 
to the purposes to be accomplished by the act." 
The constitution and laws of the State of Utah have 
always recognized that a reasonable classification 
1See also: State v. J. B. & R. E. Walker, Inc., 100 Utah 523, 
116 P.2d 766; State v. Mason, 94 Utah 501, 78 P.2d 
920, 117 A.L.R. 330; and Gronlund v. Salt Lake 
City, 113 ,Utah 284, 194 P.2d 464. 
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exists for differentiation between supreme court 
judges and district court judges. Article 8, Section 
2 of the Constitution of the State of Utah provides: 
" . . . every judge of the Supreme Court 
shall be at least 30 years of age." 
While Article 8, Section 5 of the Utah Constitution 
provides: 
" .. each judge of a district court shall 
be at least 25 years of age." 
It is evident and certainly needs no elaboration 
to the honorable justices of the this court that the 
nature of the work of a district court judge is not 
identical to the work performed by a supreme court 
justice. This is particularly true of many districts in 
Utah where a district court judge is required to 
cover a large geographical area and his work in-
volves travel over that area. Driving over large 
areas requires a certain amount of physical strength 
and physical stamina which older persons frequent-
ly do not have, and this significant difference in 
physical activity from that required of a supreme 
court justice is in itself sufficient to form a reason-
able basis for the classification included within the 
act providing for a mandatory retirement age for 
district court judges of two years younger than that 
required for supreme court judges. 
An important difference also exists in the abil-
ity of the Supreme Court to conduct business by a 
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quorum. It is a well-known fact that older persons 
tend to be ill more than younger persons, and if a 
district court judge becomes ill and unable to work, 
his district may become totally void of any acting 
judiciary; whereas, if a Supreme Court Justice be-
comes ill and unable to work, it will increase the 
workload of his associates, but it will not cripple 
the court and prevent it from acting. Also, the Su-
preme Court could obtain assistance from District 
Court Judges to distribute the workload. 
Petitioner also alleges that the right to hold elec-
tive office is a privilege and depriving a person of 
that right by reason of age alone is an unreasonable 
deprivation of that privilege, and violative of 
Amendment XIV of the United States Constitution. 
However, the right to hold elective office is no more 
of a privilege than is the right to be gainfully em-
ployed, and if mandatory retirement by reason of 
age alone is unconstitutional, then every retire-
ment rule in the country is placed in serious 
jeopardy. 
Petitioner also further alleges that a maximum 
age limitation is a denial of equal protection guar-
anteed by the United States Constitution, but the 
cases are numerous which have held that as long as 
the distinction is based on a reasonable classifica-
tion as is above stated, it is not a denial of equal 
protection, and it is suggested that a limitation 
which applies equally to all similar judicial offices 
;snot a denial of equal protection. 
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CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully suggested to this Honorable 
Court that the legislation which was properly 
passed by the legislature is in full accord with the 
intent which the voters had at the time they ap-
proved that constitutional amendment, and there 
is a reasonable construction out of two possible con-
structions, one of which would validate the statute. 
In view of the presumption of constitutionality of 
statutes, and the other factors mentioned in this 
brief, it is respectfully suggested to the Court that 
the classifications made in that statute are reason-
able and that the statute is in compliance with all 
constitutional requirements. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
Attorney General 
G. BLAINE DAVIS 
Assistant Attorney General 
VERL R. TOPHAM 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for the Defendant 
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